Title and Main Message
Paska: At first glance, the title of your book ‘Preacher of Truth’ seems ambivalent. What motivated you to choose this title and what are the central themes reflected in it?
Zimmer: A historically informed view dissolves this apparent ambivalence. We all come from deeply religious societies where truth is revealed through religious messages and sermons. The figure of the preacher, who claims the sole truth for himself and his followers and denigrates his critics as apologists for ignorance, has not left us.
Even in our supposedly secularised age, the preacher is still busy preaching in politics. In a brilliant essay, the German philosopher Odo Marquart argued that in the modern age religion has been replaced by the philosophy of history – that is, the belief that history is moving in a certain direction. In the process, the proof of God has been replaced by the proof of the enemy.
Historical Context
Paska: Your book sheds light on the Reformation culture of knowledge transfer. To what extent do you see the Reformation as paving the way for modern power relations, and how do the events of the Reformation era shape today’s political and social order?
Zimmer: Around 1500, Reformation Christianity began to redefine access to truth: away from church sovereignty and authorised dogmas. With the Holy Scriptures, lay people and lay preachers moved to the centre of events, mainly thanks to the principle of ‘sola scriptura’: what is not written in the Scriptures is not authorised by God and therefore cannot claim to be true. Not even if it is preached by priests and other church officials. Lay people and lay preachers were thus empowered to question religious principles and practices. Think of baptism, or – in the secular sphere – serfdom or land taxes. The Bible provided no legitimacy for these. Yet the establishment described them as God-given. The reformers, now part of the establishment themselves, and many of their allies responded authoritatively to the challenge of the laity by restricting the scope of biblical interpretation (for example, through catechisms) and allying themselves with the secular authorities – i.e. the early modern state.
Radical Movements
Paska: To what extent did the ideological conflicts between the Reformers and other movements, such as the Anabaptists, shape the understanding of freedom and political authority?
Zimmer: Conflicts over authority are not a 16th century invention. The idea of the well-behaved and powerless subjects of antiquity and the Middle Ages, who only learned to rebel with the Reformation and the French Revolution, is widespread in our country, even in educated circles. Historically speaking, however, this is a myth.
What gives the Reformation its world-historical significance is the fact that it combined a religiously charged conflict (which was also about very practical truths) with a communications revolution. Without the printing press and the rapid dissemination of written and pictorial messages that it made possible, its impact would probably have been limited to the region. Instead, it has shaped social development in much of the world to this day. I recommend a visit to the Reformation Memorial in Geneva. Here it becomes clear that we are dealing with a global historical event.
This pattern – loss of authority through democratisation of interpretive sovereignty and authoritarian backlash – was set in motion at the time. It demystified secular and ecclesiastical authorities who legitimated themselves through God. Their status and claim to power was relativised. Luther, that brilliant populist, tried to relativise this development again in the face of the Peasants’ War. He assured the opposing peasants that God was not on their side, but always on the side of the authorities.
The Role of the Epistocracy
Paska: The ‘epistocracy’, i.e. the rule of those who know, plays a central role in your book. What is the meaning of this term for modern liberalism, and why should someone ‘rule’ over others?
Zimmer: The claim is an old one. It can be found in Plato’s philosophical writings. The wise and knowledgeable should run the affairs of state in the interest of the common good. Somehow the idea is appealing and obvious. Who hasn’t sat on a committee of ten or more people and been annoyed by the long and complicated discussions and decision-making processes? Perhaps the following questions have crossed our minds: Wouldn’t it be great if we could delegate decision-making to a committee of three? Preferably one that shares our own prejudices and interests and then, to make it clear to everyone, calls it superior reason?
As far as liberalism is concerned, many major and minor 19th-century liberals were quite epistocratic in their outlook. They saw themselves as the ‘new aristocracy’ of talent. After all, the stakes were high. A new legal and social order was being established, and there was resistance from old and new forces. But the historical situation was full of tensions and contradictions. The Frenchman François Guizot was a resolute epistocrat who felt that civilisational progress was threatened by the masses. John Stuart Mill’s thought clearly shows epistocratic traits. Alexis de Tocqueville is a different case. As he grew older, he became a critic of the epistocratic juste milieu. This was also because he always knew that truth in politics could only be established by recognising a pluralism of experiences, interests and values.
Truth and Power
Paska: The Reformation is often seen as a liberation from ecclesiastical authority, but in your book you argue that it also created new power structures. What are the lessons for today’s political upheavals?
Zimmer: The problem is by no means limited to the Reformation and Protestantism, but that is another story that I also explore in the book.
For me, the real lesson of the Reformation, as I just mentioned with reference to Tocqueville, lies in political pluralism: in allowing contradiction, in the competition of arguments and ideas. And therefore in institutions that encourage public dissent rather than relegating it to the private sphere. Where the competition of interpretations and opinions is suppressed – and, in extreme cases, dissenters are stigmatised as enemies of the truth – radical movements emerge, which often provoke an authoritarian response. A vicious circle. To avoid this, we should accept two principles of political life: Freedom is incompatible with the need for absolute control and the idea of development without alternatives – for that is the temptation of epistocracy.
